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Reasons-Sensitivity, Causes and Counterfactuals 
 




En su libro Causation and Free Will, Carolina Sartorio ha desarrollado una concep-
ción de secuencia real del libre albedrío en términos de sensibilidad a razones. En este ar-
tículo, intento caracterizar la concepción de Sartorio y distinguirla de otras propuestas. 
Tras ello, suscito algunos problemas de la misma. En primer lugar, sostengo que la tesis 
según la cual las ausencias pueden ser causas es altamente problemática; en segundo lu-
gar, mantengo que, si los contrafácticos no son explicativamente fundamentales, como 
Sartorio sostiene, tampoco parecen serlo las causas reales; en tercer lugar, defiendo que la 
libertad y la sensibilidad a razones parecen descansar en propiedades y estructuras no 
causales. Finalmente, sostengo que los argumentos de Sartorio a favor de la tesis según la 
cual la responsabilidad moral no se basa exclusivamente en causas reales se aplican asi-
mismo al libre albedrío. 
 




In her book Causation and Free Will, Carolina Sartorio has developed an actual-
sequence account of free will in terms of sensitivity to reasons. In this paper, I try to give 
a sense of Sartorio’s account and to distinguish it from other proposals on offer. After 
that, I bring to light some problems of her view. I argue, first, that Sartorio’s thesis that 
absences can be causes is highly contentious; second, I hold that, if counterfactuals are 
not explanatorily fundamental, as she defends, actual causes do not seem to be so, either; 
third, I contend that freedom and reasons-sensitivity seem to rest on non-causal proper-
ties and structures. Finally, I hold that Sartorio’s arguments for the view that moral re-
sponsibility is not exclusively grounded in actual causes apply to free will as well. 
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So-called “Frankfurt cases” have led many philosophers, including 
especially Harry Frankfurt and John Fischer, to actual-sequence accounts 
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of moral responsibility (and, to some extent, free will), according to 
which only features of the actual history of a choice or action are rele-
vant to the agent’s responsibility for them. Against alternative-
possibilities accounts, it does not matter, for the agent’s freedom and re-
sponsibility for her choice or action, whether she was or was not able to 
choose or act otherwise. In her recent book Causation and Free Will, Caro-
lina Sartorio develops a distinctive version of an actual-sequence account 
of free will, according to which, when agents choose and act freely, their 
freedom is exclusively grounded in, and supervenes on, the actual causal 
history of such choices or actions. She labels her account ACS (for “ac-
tual causal sequence”). On this basis, Sartorio develops a positive ac-
count of free will. Like Fischer’s, but unlike Frankfurt’s, hers is a 
reasons-responsiveness (“reasons-sensitivity” in her terms), not a hierar-
chy or harmony, account. Moreover, unlike Fischer’s and Frankfurt’s, 
hers is a purely causal account: the only freedom-relevant features of the 
actual sequence are causal facts. Sartorio’s view implies the thesis that 
causation is the exclusive metaphysical grounding of free will. For a lib-
ertarian incompatibilist like me, who holds that (deterministic) causation 
cannot coexist with free will, this thesis sounds fairly extreme, for it im-
plies, not merely that causation and free will are compatible, a view that 
may be called “standard compatibilism”, but also that causation, given that 
it is the only ground of free will, is required for the latter. This contention 
may be called “strong compatibilism”1 and is more abruptly at odds with 
an incompatibilist approach to free will than standard compatibilism. 
I have argued elsewhere against Sartorio’s ACS and for an alterna-
tive-possibilities account of free will.2 In the present paper, I focus on 
Sartorio’s positive account of free will in terms of sensitivity to reasons. 
In the first section I try to give a sense of Sartorio’s reasons-sensitivity 
account of freedom and to determine what distinguishes it from other 
actual-sequence accounts. The idea that absences can be causes is crucial-
ly important in this respect. In the second section I bring to light some 
problems of Sartorio’s proposal. I point, first, to problems related to the 
view that absences can be causes; second, to problems with her substitu-
tion of actual causes for counterfactuals as explanatorily fundamental; 
and third, to problems with her view that freedom and reasons-
sensitivity are exclusively grounded in actual causal facts. These problems 
are reinforced in the third section, where I hold that Sartorio’s arguments 
for the view that moral responsibility is not exclusively grounded in actu-
al causes apply to free will as well. All these critical considerations, if cor-
Reasons-Sensitivity, Causes and Counterfactuals                                             79 
teorema XXXVII/1, 2018, pp. 77-91 
rect, throw serious doubts about the truth of her reasons-sensitivity ac-
count of free will. 
 
 
I. SARTORIO’S ‘REASONS-SENSITIVITY’ APPROACH TO FREE WILL 
 
As I have anticipated, current actual-sequence approaches to moral 
responsibility and freedom come in two main forms. They have in com-
mon the rejection of an alternative-possibilities condition for moral respon-
sibility. 
There are, on the one hand, hierarchy or harmony approaches,3 de-
fended by such philosophers as Harry Frankfurt (1971, 1975), Gary Wat-
son (1982) and Susan Wolf (1990). According to these proposals, 
whether an action is free, and the agent is responsible for it, depends on 
whether it is in harmony with certain elements of the agent’s psychologi-
cal structure. For Frankfurt, e.g., these elements include her desires and 
her desires about these desires (second-order desires). So, Frankfurt 
writes: “Suppose that a person has done what he wanted to do, that he 
did it because he wanted to do it, and that the will by which he was 
moved when he did it was his will because it was the will he wanted. 
Then he did it freely and of his own free will” [Frankfurt (1971), p. 24]. 
For Watson, the crucial elements that have to be in harmony are desires 
and values or, more generally, the agent’s motivational and axiological 
systems. Wolf adds to the latter elements an objective, normative factor: 
the agent should be able to form her values in accordance to such criteria 
as truth and goodness. 
There are, on the other hand, reasons-responsiveness approaches, 
represented by philosophers like John Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998), 
Ishtiyaque Haji (1998) and R. Jay Wallace (1994). According to Fischer 
and Ravizza (1998), pp. 41-44, an agent acts freely, and is morally re-
sponsible for her action, only if it results from a deliberative ‘mechanism’ 
that is responsive to reasons.4 Roughly, an agent’s deliberative mecha-
nism is reasons-responsive provided that, at least in some possible sce-
narios, or possible worlds, in which this mechanism is in operation, if 
there are sufficient reasons to do otherwise, she will recognize these rea-
sons and, as a result of this recognition, will choose and act otherwise. 
An example of Fischer himself can help us see the rationale of this ap-
proach. Suppose that Peggy steals a book from the University library for 
reasons of self-interest, but that she would persist in stealing the book 
even if she knew that doing so would cause the ruin of herself and her 
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family. It seems that we are not facing an agent with a sound ability to 
deliberate and decide rationally, which compromises her freedom and 
moral responsibility for her action. If so, then the ability to respond to 
reasons in the indicated sense, to accommodate our choices and actions 
to our reasons, is a requirement of freedom and moral responsibility.5  
Sartorio’s actual-sequence approach to free will belongs to this sec-
ond group. However, she departs from Fischer’s account in some im-
portant respects. According to Sartorio, Fischer’s view of reasons-
responsiveness is not a purely actual-sequence proposal, for it involves 
essentially modal notions and counterfactuals about how the agent 
would act in certain possible situations. Sartorio’s account of freedom re-
sorts just to the actual causal history of the action. It does not include 
modal notions such as possible scenarios or possible worlds. Her pro-
posal is formulated exclusively in terms of actual causes. According to 
her account, “being sensitive to reasons is not a matter of doing other-
wise in the relevant counterfactual scenarios, as traditional accounts of 
reasons-sensitivity would say; rather, it’s a matter of acting on the basis 
of the right kinds of causes–actual causes” [Sartorio (2016), pp. 132-133]. 
But how can we account for an agent’s sensitivity to reasons, which 
is an ability or capacity, exclusively in terms of the actual causes of her 
action? It does not seem, for example, that Peggy’s lack of reasons-
sensitivity has only to do with the actual causes of her stealing, namely 
desires related to self-interest. The fact that Peggy’s stealing the book 
was caused by such self-interested desires seems compatible with both 
her possession and her lack of reasons-sensitivity. So, it seems that we 
cannot dispense with reference to possible scenarios and to counterfac-
tuals about the way Peggy would behave in them as an essential criterion 
of her sensitivity to reasons or lack thereof. 
Sartorio is not unaware of these worries. As she writes: “The shift 
from a counterfactual approach to an approach in terms of actual causes 
might seem surprising, at first, as an account of reasons-sensitivity. Isn’t 
sensitivity to reasons, after all, mainly a dispositional concept and, as 
such, shouldn’t it be cashed out counterfactually?” [Sartorio (2016), p. 
133]. Sartorio does not forbid the use of counterfactuals in judgments 
about an agent’s sensitivity to reasons, but she does not take these coun-
terfactuals to be explanatorily fundamental. According to her, what is ex-
planatorily fundamental are actual causes. But how can she meet the 
objection we have raised, namely that, in many cases, the actual causes of 
a choice or action are compatible with both possession and lack of rea-
sons-sensitivity? 
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Sartorio’s crucial move in this context is to hold that the actual 
causes of an event include not only the presence of certain factors but al-
so the absence of others. The view of causation that Sartorio elaborates in 
the first three chapters of her book, which provide the metaphysical 
foundation for her reasons-sensitivity account of free will in the fourth 
chapter, includes the thesis that absences can be causes. For example,6 a 
fire in the forest can be caused, not only by a lightning, which is a posi-
tive factor, but also by lack of sufficient humidity, which is a negative 
factor, the absence of something. In the practical field, on this perspec-
tive, our actions are caused, not just by our positive reasons to perform 
them,7 but also by the absence of reasons to refrain from performing 
them. As she writes, 
 
Typically, the causal histories of our acts involve a few positive reasons as 
well as the absence of a large number of negative reasons. For example, if 
I go to the park to get some fresh air, my desire to get some fresh air and 
the relevant belief are my actual positive reasons, but there is also a long 
list of counterfactual negative reasons whose absence is causally explanatory: 
no one offered me a thousand dollars to stay home, I didn’t receive an 
important phone call, no one needed my immediate help, etc. [Sartorio 
(2016), pp. 143-4]. 
 
Remember Peggy’s example. Suppose, however, that she is sensitive to 
reasons, so that she would not steal the book from the library if she had 
important reasons not to steal it (e.g. if she believed that the ruin for her 
and her family would result from her stealing). This is a counterfactual 
statement. For Fischer, Peggy’s practical reasoning mechanism is reasons-
sensitive mainly because this counterfactual is true of her. In Fischer’s 
conception, the counterfactual is true because, with the actual mechanism 
in operation, in some possible worlds in which there are important rea-
sons not to steal the book, Peggy recognizes these reasons and does not 
steal the book. According to Sartorio, however, this counterfactual, even 
if true, is not explanatorily fundamental, but is itself explained by more 
fundamental causal facts. The counterfactual is true, according to her, 
because Peggy’s stealing was actually caused both by the presence of cer-
tain reasons, e.g. the desire to get the book for free, and also (crucially) 
by the absence of other reasons (e.g. the belief that stealing the book would 
result in the ruin of hers and her family).8 In deciding to steal the book 
and doing so, Peggy is actually responding to the absence of this and 
other reasons to refrain from stealing. She is acting because of this ab-
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sence. And it is this actual causal relation between her act and the ab-
sence of these reasons that ultimately grounds and explains her sensitivi-
ty to reasons, as well as the truth of the relevant counterfactuals. 
Here is Sartorio’s causal account of reasons-sensitivity, which she 
calls CRS (Causal Reasons-Sensitivity): 
 
CRS (Causal Reasons-Sensitivity): An agent is reasons-sensitive in acting in a 
certain way when the agent acts on the basis of, perhaps in addition to the 
presence of reasons to act in the relevant way, the absence of sufficient rea-
sons to refrain from acting in that way, for an appropriately wide range of 
such reasons [Sartorio (2016), p. 132]. 
 
As she clarifies [Ibid., p. 132], “on the basis of” is intended as a causal 
locution. So, we are reasons-sensitive in acting when our act has the ap-
propriate causes, which include especially absences of reasons to refrain 
from acting in that way. 
Unlike Fischer’s, Sartorio’s proposal does not mention possible 
scenarios or other modal notions, and does not essentially contain coun-
terfactuals, either. Only actual causal relations and causal facts are in-
voked. It is, then, an austere and purely actual-sequence account of free 
will. Or so it seems. But, its austerity and purity notwithstanding, I think 
it is not free of problems, as I will try to argue in what follows. 
 
 
II. SOME PROBLEMS OF SARTORIO’S PROPOSAL 
 
To begin with, the thesis that absences of certain factors can be 
causes is far from uncontroversial. It is true that we explain certain phe-
nomena by resorting to absences, or negative features. But this does not 
imply that these negative features are causes; they may often be back-
ground conditions, which are required for the efficacy of causal factors, 
but need not be causal factors themselves. That a certain absence is part 
of the explanation of a phenomenon does not imply that it is part of the 
causal history of that phenomenon. The lightning caused the fire in the 
forest, on the background of a lack of rain and humidity. Intuitively, 
what caused the fire was a positive event, the lightning, though the ab-
sence of water and humidity was part of the conditions that explained 
the causal efficacy of that event, then and there, in giving rise to the fire. 
Moreover, some apparent absences, or negative features, are in fact 
present positive features. Lack of humidity, for example, may be just an-
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other way of referring to dryness, which is a positive feature of the forest 
when the lightning hit it. In Peggy’s example, is it also the case that the 
absence of the belief that stealing the book will ruin her and her family 
may be another way of referring to the presence of a positive belief, the 
belief that this will not be the case? Not necessarily. That someone does 
not believe that p does not imply that she believes that not-p. It may be, 
for instance, that she has no opinion about whether p, or that she does 
not even understand, or care about, the question whether p. Nonetheless, 
this does not seem to be what happens with Peggy. Assuming that she is 
a cognitively normal agent, it is intuitively plausible to assume that she 
does not believe that her stealing the book will ruin her and her family. 
And, if so, it is also plausible to assume that she believes that her stealing 
the book will not ruin her and her family, so that these two beliefs are 
equivalent in Peggy’s cognitive and motivational landscape. In Peggy’s 
case, the absence of the belief that p amounts to the presence of the be-
lief that not-p.  
Applied to Peggy’s case, Sartorio’s contention would be that Peggy 
is reasons-sensitive in stealing the book if her act is caused by the ab-
sence of several reasons, prominent among which is the belief that steal-
ing the book will ruin her and her family. We have argued that, in this 
particular case, the absence of this belief amounts to the presence of the 
belief that her stealing will not provoke that ruin. Let us then focus on 
the latter. This belief is reasonably taken to be non-occurrent, for we 
may plausibly suppose that, unlike her desire to get the book for free and 
the relevant belief, the belief that the stealing will not ruin her and her 
family is not present to Peggy’s consciousness. The belief is purely dis-
positional; it does not play any active role in Peggy’s actual reasoning and 
mental processes.9 But we may safely ascribe her this belief in that, e.g., 
after short reflection, she would assent if asked whether she believed 
this. But are purely dispositional beliefs causes? The question is akin to 
asking whether fragility caused the shattering of a glass when it hit the 
floor. We can say this, but the explanation is different from saying that 
the glass shattered because of its hitting the floor. Appealing to the fra-
gility of the glass may be part of an explanation of its shattering, but not 
necessarily a causal explanation. It is a dispositional explanation. Fragili-
ty, as a dispositional property of the glass, may be a background condi-
tion, which allows for the impact to cause the break. Fragility is there, 
but not as a cause. Similarly, dryness can be a background condition, 
which allows the lightning to cause the fire. But if absences are back-
ground conditions, or sometimes dispositions, they are not proper caus-
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es. Of course, one may hold they are causes by stretching the meaning of 
“cause” to cover dispositions and background conditions, but this would 
be a merely nominal, not a substantial, move. It would not show that ab-
sences are causes. Using “cause” as an umbrella-term to cover disposi-
tions, background conditions and, to use a traditional term, efficient causes 
blurs a difference between explanatory tools that is intuitively there. Our 
conclusion so far is that an account of reasons-sensitivity in terms of ab-
sences of reasons is not a purely causal account, against Sartorio’s conten-
tion. We will strengthen this conclusion with other considerations. 
Another problem has to do with Sartorio’s thesis that counterfactu-
als about what a certain agent would do (or would have done) if she had 
(had) some reasons that she does not have are not explanatorily funda-
mental for what concerns her reasons-sensitivity and freedom. Accord-
ing to her, the truth of these counterfactuals rests on actual causes, both 
present and absent. Absent causes are especially relevant in this respect. 
As she writes, 
 
Once we recognize the relevance of the absence of reasons to refrain, and 
how those absences can figure in the causal history of the actual behavior, 
it is natural to see the counterfactual facts as not at all explanatorily fun-
damental. That is to say, the relevant counterfactual facts can still obtain, 
but, when they do, it’s by virtue of what the actual sequence is, or how it is 
constituted (in particular, in virtue of the fact that the actual sequence con-
tains certain absences of reasons), or by virtue of the grounds of those ac-
tual-sequence facts themselves [Sartorio (2016), p. 133]. 
 
Applied to Peggys’ example, her view seems to be that the counterfactual 
statement that Peggy would not have stolen the book if she had believed 
that doing so would ruin her and her family is true because his stealing 
the book is (partly) caused by the absence of that belief. Actual causal 
facts, and not counterfactuals, are explanatorily basic for an agent’s free-
dom and reasons-sensitivity. Using the example of someone who takes a 
drug but is not an addict, so that she is sensitive to reasons not to take the 
drug, Sartorio writes: 
 
[I]t’s because the non-addict is constituted in such a way that he appropri-
ately responds to reasons in the actual scenario that we judge that, at least 
in normal circumstances, he wouldn’t have taken the drug if some relevant 
reason to refrain had been present. Although this counterfactual is true, it 
is not what makes the non-addict free when he takes the drug in the actual 
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scenario. What makes him free is the fact that, in taking the drug, he is ac-
tually responding to the absence of those reasons [Sartorio (2016), p. 133]. 
 
As a preliminary critical remark, it seems to me that the content of the 
statement that, in taking the drug, the non-addict was responding to the 
absence of important reasons to refrain is not very different from the 
content of the counterfactual statement according to which she would 
not have taken the drug if she had had some important reason to refrain. 
And the same applies to Peggy’s example. The content of the statement 
that, in stealing the book, Peggy was acting on the basis of the absence 
of a reason to refrain from stealing it is not very different from the con-
tent of the counterfactual statement according to which she would not 
have stolen the book if she had had that reason to refrain. The formulation 
in terms of absences as causes and in terms of counterfactuals seem to be 
notational variations, alternative ways of expressing the same thought. But 
it strikes me that the counterfactual formulation is more perspicuous and 
natural than the formulation in terms of absences as causes. 
Let us tackle the question of explanatory priority of actual causes 
over counterfactuals. I can agree with Sartorio that reasons-sensitivity 
has to do partly with features of the actual scenario in which an agent 
chooses and acts, and that counterfactuals are not explanatorily funda-
mental concerning an agent’s freedom and reasons-sensitivity. But, even 
if we accept this, the fact that an agent actually responds to the absence 
of certain reasons does not seem to be explanatorily fundamental, either. 
For what concerns explanatory fundamentality, actual causal facts seem 
to be on a par with counterfactuals. Are we prepared to say that it is just 
an explanatorily fundamental fact that the agent responds to (the absence 
of) certain reasons? I, for one, am not. The natural question to raise is: 
why is it that she responds to (the absence of) such reasons? And the 
right answer would seem to be: because she has sound skills, abilities or 
capacities for practical reasoning, for assessment of considerations, for-
mation of intentions, etc. It is by virtue of these capacities, which she ac-
tually possesses, that the counterfactuals are true; their truth derives from 
the possession of these abilities. But these abilities and skills are not 
causes, or causal facts. Now, the same considerations apply to actual causal facts, 
such as that, in choosing and acting, the agent is responding to the ab-
sence of certain reasons. Why do these facts obtain? The answer points 
also to sound abilities, skills and capacities for practical deliberation and 
choice. The features of the actual scenario that ground an agent’s rea-
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sons-sensitivity are neither counterfactuals nor actual causal facts, but a 
cluster of fairly good abilities for practical thinking and decision-making. 
We might even hold that these abilities and skills are not explanato-
rily fundamental, either, if we accept that abilities and dispositions are 
grounded in categorical bases (like, e.g., solubility is grounded in a certain 
molecular structure). In the case of the ability to deliberate and decide, it 
can be taken to rest on certain highly complex psychological and psy-
chophysical structures.10 However, these structures are not and cannot 
be reduced to causal facts and relations, either. 
So, I do not find Sartorio’s view that freedom and reasons-sensitivity 
are grounded only in actual causal facts convincing. They seem to rest 
partly on non-causal properties and structures. 
 
 
III. MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND FREE WILL 
 
According to Sartorio’s ACS approach, then, free will is exclusively 
grounded in actual causes or causal facts. The qualification “exclusively” 
is crucially important in order to distinguish her view from other actual-
sequence approaches, which may include, among the grounds of free-
dom, features of the actual sequence that are not causal. As I have just 
argued, I think this is precisely the case. But the qualification is also cru-
cial for distinguishing Sartorio’s approach from some alternative-
possibilities approaches, since an alternative-possibilities theorist can ac-
cept that freedom is partly grounded in features of the actual sequence, 
and that some of them may be causal. What this theorist adds to this 
contention is that freedom is also grounded in the availability of alterna-
tive possibilities. So, the distinctive thesis of Sartorio’s ACS with respect 
to both other actual-sequence proposals and some alternative-
possibilities views is the claim that freedom with respect to a choice or 
action is not grounded in anything other than the actual causal history 
that issues in that choice or action. As she proposes to understand actual 
sequences, “the actual sequence issuing in an act is just its causal history” 
[Sartorio (2016), p. 21]. 
However, Sartorio does not think that this thesis about free will 
applies also to (moral) responsibility. According to her, responsibility in-
volves a cognitive or epistemic component that is not properly causal. 
She writes: 
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Recall that responsibility is supposed to involve, in addition to the free-
dom or control component, a purely epistemic component: one that tracks, 
roughly, the agents’ awareness of their acts and the moral significance of 
their acts. In light of this, it is far from clear why anyone would think that 
responsibility should also be exclusively grounded in actual [causal] se-
quences [Sartorio (2016), p. 35]. 
 
In order to argue that responsibility is not exclusively grounded in actual 
[causal] sequences, Sartorio designs the following example: 
 
Squeaky Button: I love squeaky sounds. I know that pushing a 
certain button would result in a squeaky sound, so I push the but-
ton to hear the sound [Sartorio (2016), p. 36]. 
 
The example has two variants, Aware and Unaware. In the Aware vari-
ant, I know that pushing the button will result in the destruction of a 
remote village. I do not want those people to die, but I do really like 
squeaky sounds, I know of no other way to hear one and press the but-
ton to hear it. In the Unaware variant, instead, I am not aware of the ter-
rible consequences of my pressing the button, and no cognitively normal 
human being could foresee that consequence. 
According to Sartorio, I am responsible for the village’s destruction 
in the Aware variant, but not in the Unaware variant. A difficulty I have 
in admitting that I am responsible in the Aware variant has to do with 
the extreme character of this variant. Someone who presses the button 
just for the pleasure of hearing the loved sound while knowing about the 
horrendous consequence thereof looks clearly insane and then he is 
plausibly not a responsible agent.11 This difficulty, however, could easily 
be circumvented by changing and softening conveniently the details of 
the example; if so, then it does not affect the essential point, namely that 
I am responsible in Aware but not in Unaware. In both cases, Sartorio 
writes, “what motivates me to push the button is … the desire to hear 
the squeaky sound” [Sartorio (2016), p. 36]. Sartorio assumes that, from 
a causal point of view, both variants are on a par, but, since there is a dif-
ference in responsibility, this difference is not due to causal elements. It 
is due, presumably, to an epistemic component of responsibility (the 
awareness or unawareness of the connection between pressing the but-
ton to hear the sound and the wiping out of the village) beyond freedom 
or control conditions: “[T]he consequences of my behavior for which I 
can be held responsible are only those that I could reasonably anticipate. 
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In other words, the epistemic conditions for responsibility are met in one 
scenario and not in the other, and, intuitively, this is what accounts for 
the difference in responsibility” [Sartorio (2016), p. 36]. 
My reaction to this is that the same considerations can be applied 
to the freedom with which I caused the destruction of the village 
through my pressing the button. It seems to me that there is a difference, 
not only in responsibility, but also in freedom, between the Aware and 
the Unaware variant of Squeaky Button. I think it is correct to say that I 
freely destroyed the village (or I freely allowed it to be destroyed) in the 
Aware variant, but not in the Unaware variant, assuming that, in the lat-
ter variant, I could not reasonably foresee that pressing the button would 
result in that massacre. It seems right to say that I do not freely do what 
I am (non-culpably) unaware of being doing or causing with my action, 
provided that I cannot reasonably know or anticipate it. Therefore, a 
cognitive component is also present in freedom, and not only in respon-
sibility. If this is on the right track, then cognitive, non-causal conditions 
underlie, not only responsibility, but freedom as well. So, though I agree 
with Sartorio that responsibility is not exclusively grounded in actual 
causal sequences, in that it has a purely epistemic component, I hold that 
the same is true of freedom. Freedom has also a non-causal, epistemic 
component and, if this is so, then ACS fails, since it contends that free-





With Sartorio, I also think that sensitivity or responsiveness to rea-
sons is necessary for free will and moral responsibility. However, I disa-
gree with her for what respects her analysis of reasons-sensitivity. I have 
tried to argue that Sartorio’s exclusively causal account of reasons-
sensitivity fails. First, the notion of absences as causes is deeply prob-
lematic. Absences can be just background conditions or dispositions, or 
both, and not properly causes. Sometimes they can also amount to the 
presence of positive causes. Moreover, I have argued that, if counterfac-
tuals are not explanatorily fundamental, as Sartorio holds, neither actual 
causes are. Freedom and reasons-sensitivity seem to rest ultimately on 
non-causal properties and structures, which include abilities and skills for 
practical deliberation and decision-making. Moreover, I have held that 
Sartorio’s view that moral responsibility is not exclusively grounded in 
actual causes, but has also a cognitive component, should also be ex-
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tended to free will. But this cognitive component is not properly causal. 
My general conclusion, then, is that free will is not exclusively grounded 
in actual causes and that ACS ultimately fails. 
I have an even deeper disagreement with Sartorio, though I cannot 
justify it here: as a libertarian, I think that alternative possibilities at the 
reach of the agent are also necessary for free will and moral responsibil-
ity.12 In order for an agent to decide and act freely, and to be morally re-
sponsible for such a decision and action, she should be able to decide 
and act otherwise, even with the constellation of reasons that she actually 
had, then and there, when she decided and acted as she actually did.13 
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1 Hobart (1934) is an early example of a strong compatibilist account. 
2 See Moya (forthcoming). 
3 Sometimes they are also called “mesh-theories”.  
4 They include, additionally, the requirement that the ‘mechanism’ in ques-
tion should be the agent’s own. For simplicity of exposition, we will let aside 
this additional requirement. 
5 In Fischer and Ravizza’s approach, the scenarios in which an agent 
would do otherwise are conceived as purely counterfactual. There is no sugges-
tion that she should have real access to those scenarios. So, the proposal re-
mains compatibilist in spirit: even if determinism is true, and there are no 
alternative possibilities of choice and action, this does not exclude free action 
and moral responsibility. The proposal is also compatibilist in that there is no 
suggestion that the agent should be able to change her choice without a change 
in her reasons. 
6 The example is mine, not Sartorio’s. 
7 An important assumption in Sartorio’s view is a causal conception of 
reasons, according to which reasons are (a species of) causes. Though widely 
shared after Davidson’s path-breaking article “Actions, reasons, and causes”, it 
is not universally accepted. Philosophers like Carl Ginet (2002), (2008), Hugh 
McCann (1998) and Stewart Goetz (2009) reject it. I tend to agree with the lat-
ter, but I am not going to discuss this question here. 
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8 In addition to her agreement with a causal conception of reasons, Sarto-
rio accepts, with many other authors, that reasons to act are psychological states, 
such as beliefs and desires. I am taking for granted this view just for the sake of 
argument, without committing myself to it. A significant minority of philoso-
phers, such as Jonathan Dancy (2000) and Maria Alvarez (2010), do not accept 
that view. 
9 I write “purely dispositional” in that, in some sense, all beliefs include 
dispositions to infer, reason, and even to act. 
10 These structures would be sufficient, but not necessary, for the abilities, ow-
ing to the widely acknowledged possibility of multiple physical/neurophysiological 
realization of dispositions and functional properties in general. 
11 For a defense of sanity as a condition of responsibility, see Wolf (1987). 
12 As I said, I have argued for this alternative-possibilities approach to 
freedom and moral responsibility, against Sartorio’s ACS account, in my (forth-
coming). See also, for a defense of alternative possibilities as a requirement of 
freedom and moral responsibility, my (2007), (2011) and (2014), among other 
writings. 
13 This paper is part of the research project “Self-Knowledge, Moral Re-
sponsibility and Authenticity” (FFI2016-75323-P), awarded by the Spanish Minis-
try of Economy and Competitiveness and the European Regional Development 
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